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 RESPECTING THE “GUARDIANS OF NATURE:” CHILE’S 
VIOLATIONS OF THE DIAGUITA INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEED TO 
ENFORCE OBLIGATIONS TO OBTAIN FREE, PRIOR, AND 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Cynthia Vel* 
INTRODUCTION 
On the 20th anniversary of the International Year of the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples,1 Chile’s Diaguita Huascoaltino community celebrated 
a victory for indigenous peoples’ rights,2 but not before enduring almost 
twenty years of repeated human rights violations.  Despite having specific 
protections carved out under international human rights laws, the Diaguita 
experienced serious infringements of their international rights at the hands 
of the national government and one of the largest gold producers in the 
world.    
Despite the wide range of domestic and international laws 
protecting the rights of Chile’s indigenous peoples, the Diaguita found 
these rights challenged when Canadian mining giant, Barrick Gold, 
through its subsidiary Nevada Mining Co., began constructing the world’s 
largest open pit mine, Pascua Lama, on lands historically belonging to the 
                                                         
* J.D. Candidate, December 2014, Florida A&M University College of Law; B.A., 
University of Central Florida. Special thanks to Randall S. Abate, Associate Professor of 
Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Justice at Florida A&M 
University College of Law, for his invaluable guidance and support in the preparation of 
this article.   
 
1
 Living History: Inauguration of the International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, 
3 TRANS NAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 168 (1993).  
2
 Sarah Tory, Chilean Court Rules in Favor of Suspension of Pascua-Lama Mine, THE 
SANTIAGO TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://santiagotimes.cl/chilean-court-rules-in-favor-of-
suspension-of-pascua-lama/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
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indigenous community.3  With the approval of the Pascua Lama mining 
project, Chile violated the Diaguita community’s international and domestic 
rights, including the right to free, prior, and informed consent and the right 
to property and natural resources.  This case illustrates the problem 
Chile’s indigenous peoples face: the existing bodies of domestic law have 
been unable to adequately enforce the rights of the indigenous peoples in 
Chile, opening the door for the continued damage and depletion of already 
scarce natural resources.  Chile must address this problem by modeling 
Venezuela’s and Peru’s legal frameworks and implementing domestic 
laws that will enforce its international obligations as well as encourage the 
compliance of the private sector.  
Located in Northern Chile’s Huasco Valley, the Diaguita 
Huascoaltinos are a silvopastoral community.  As such, they rely on the 
herding of goats and mules, in addition to small scale farming as a means 
of survival.4  Between the 1500s, when the Spaniards arrived in the 
Huasco Valley, and the early 2000s, the Diaguita community was largely 
an unrecognized group in Chilean society.5  In 2006, the Chilean 
government enacted Law No. 20.117, recognizing the “existence and 
cultural attributes of the Diaguita ethnicity and the indigenous nature of the 
Diaguita people.”6  With their status as indigenous peoples solidified, the 
Diaguita community is now entitled to the special protections afforded to 
Chile’s indigenous peoples under its domestic laws.  
In the international realm, various treaties and declarations 
recognize and extend specific rights to the indigenous and tribal peoples.  
These instruments outline protections ranging from the right to property 
and natural resources in the American Convention on Human Rights to 
                                                         
3
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos & Their Members v. Chile, Petition 415/07, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 141/09, ¶ 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chile415.05eng.htm (last visited May 15, 
2015) [hereinafter Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos].  
4
 Id. at ¶ 3.  
5
 Nancy Yañez & Sarah Rea, The Valley of Gold, 30.4 LAND & RES.S AM.’S (June 9, 
2010), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/chile/valley-
gold (last visited Apr. 6, 2014) [hereinafter The Valley of Gold].  
6
 Id. (citing Law No. 20.117, Agosto 28, 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile)).  
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the right to self-determination in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).  For these rights and other rights 
to be fully respected, they depend on the fulfillment of the obligation to 
obtain free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).  International Labour 
Organization Convention 169 (ILO Convention 169) extends this right to 
consultation to indigenous peoples.   However, ILO Convention 169, like 
other international instruments, relies on implementation and enforcement 
to occur on the domestic level, which often results in an “implementation 
gap.”7 
Part I of this article will discuss the impact of Barrick Gold’s Pascua 
Lama mining project on the Diaguita Huascoaltino community; and how 
the country’s failure to consult with the community before approving the 
project resulted in water contamination, violations of property rights, and 
depletion of the community’s natural resources.  Part II describes the 
international legal framework that currently addresses the human rights of 
indigenous peoples, as well as Chile’s domestic laws regulating the 
environment and mining projects.  
Part III proposes that Chile consider aspects of successful legal 
frameworks of other Latin American countries and implement domestic 
laws to fulfill the international obligations of FPIC and implement 
educational measures that compel private extraction companies to adhere 
to the FPIC process.  By implementing this proposal Chile will enforce the 
rights of its indigenous peoples, and prevent the public and private sectors 
from continuing to destroy and deplete the indigenous peoples’ scarce 
natural resources.   
  
                                                         
7
 Alexandra R. Harrington, Don’t Mind the Gap: The Rise of Individual Complaint 
Mechanisms Within International Human Rights Treaties, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 
153, 153 (2012).  
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I. THE DIAGUITA HUASCOALTINOS AND THE PASCUA LAMA MINE 
Chile’s Huasco Valley is one of the most arid regions in the world.8  
Located along the Huasco River, the valley is the main source of water for 
the Diaguita people.9  The river, measuring 700 miles in length, is fed by 
two tributaries and several glaciers.10  As a result of climate change and 
local mining activity, these glaciers are now limited both in size and in 
number.11  The Diaguita community depends on the Huasco River to 
maintain its traditional way of life.12  Any reduction or contamination of its 
water source would result in a dramatic socio-cultural impact on the 
community’s customs and traditions.13  
The Diaguitas’ claim to the Huasco Valley originated from the 
Juzcado de Letras de Vallenar, in March 1902.14  This judgment granted 
legal title through adverse possession to persons occupying a parcel of 
land immemorial, thus legitimizing the Diaguitas’ possession of their 
traditional lands in 1903.15  Between 1903 and 1993, when Chile passed 
amendment No. 19.233 Ley de Comunidades Agricolas (Law of 
Agricultural Communities), the Diaguitas encountered challenges to their 
property rights as local farmers produced subsequent titles, bereft of legal 
value, and claimed ownership of the property.16  The 1993 legislation 
allowed the Diaguita community to once again register and retain title to its 
                                                         
8
 SUSTAINABLE DEV. STRATEGIES GRP., REPORT: CURRENT ISSUES IN THE CHILEAN MINING 
SECTOR 8 (2010), available at http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08-
CHILE-REPORT.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014). 
9
 The Valley of Gold, supra note 5.  
10
 Id.  
11
 Lindsey Nicholson et al., Glacier Inventory of the Upper Huasco Valley, Norte Chico, 
Chile: Glacier Characteristics, Glacier Change and Comparison with Central Chile, 50 
ANNALS GLAC. 111, 117 (2009), available at http://lindseynicholson.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Nicholson-et-al..-2010.-Annals-Of-Glaciology.-Glacier-inventory-
of-the-upper-Huasco-valley-Norte-Chico-Chile-glacier-characteristics-glacier-change-and-
comparison-with-central-Chil.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).  
12
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 14. 
13
 Id. 
14
 IVAN PIZARRO ET AL, EL VALLE DE LOS NATURALES: UNA MIRADA HISTÓRICA AL PUEBLO 
DIAGUITA HUASCOALTINO [THE VALLEY OF THE NATIVES: A HISTORY OF THE DIAGUITA 
HUASCOALTINO PEOPLE] 3 (2006) [hereinafter VALLEY OF THE NATIVES]. 
15
 Id.  
16
 Id. at 99-100. 
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land in 1997, this time as an agricultural community.17  Chile had not yet 
recognized the Diaguita as indigenous peoples in 1993, and this law was 
intended to protect the lands of agricultural communities that did not fall 
within the protections of Chile’s indigenous laws.18   Unfortunately, this law 
failed to protect the community’s title and served as the genesis of the 
current controversy facing the indigenous community.  
 As a result of the 1997 registration, the Diaguita Huascoaltinos 
ultimately lost a significant portion of their land to the fraudulent title 
holders.19  One parcel of land in particular was eventually sold to Nevada 
Mining Co, Barrick Gold’s subsidiary in Chile, and is now the location of 
the Pascua Lama mining project.20  A small group of Diaguita, and an 
individual landowner, subsequently filed civil suits against Barrick 
challenging the land transfers.21  Both suits, however, were decided in 
favor of Barrick, and the plans to construct the open pit mine moved 
forward.22  
A. Procedural History of the Dispute 
 Public disproval of the Pascua Lama mining project began early on 
when Barrick Gold submitted an environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
to Chile’s regional environmental commission (COREMA).23  The EIA 
requires companies and project owners to disclose all adverse 
consequences the proposed project will have on the environment, as well 
as on human life.24   Where injurious ramifications are identified, such as 
the displacement of the community or a significant disturbance to the 
                                                         
17
 Law No. 19.233, Julio 21, 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] (Chile). 
18
 VALLEY OF THE NATIVES, supra note 14, at 112-3. 
19
 Id. at 113. 
20
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos supra note 3, at ¶ 8. 
21
 NANCY YAÑEZ, LAS IMPLICANCIAS DEL PROYECTO MINERO PASCUA LAMA DESDE LA 
PERSPECTIVA DE LOS DERECHOS INDÍGENAS [THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PASCUA LAMA MINING 
PROJECT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS] 2 ( 2005) [hereinafter 
IMPLICATIONS OF PASCUA LAMA]; Steve Anderson, Chile Appeals Courts in Favor of Barrick 
Gold, THE SANTIAGO TIMES (Oct. 3, 2007), http://santiagotimes.cl/chile-appeals-court-in-
favor-of-barrick-gold/ (last visited May 19, 2014).   
22
 IMPLICATIONS OF PASCUA LAMA, supra note 21, 7-8.  
23
 Id. at 3. 
24
 Id. at 5. 
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community’s customs and way of life, the company must define the 
measures that will be taken to mitigate or redress the damage.25  Public 
dissension followed the approval of Barrick Gold’s EIA because the study 
failed to disclose that the Pascua Lama ore deposits were located 
underneath three Andean glaciers.26  For the barren, desert-like Huasco 
Valley, these glaciers and the water they supply are an essential element 
to the Diaguita Huascoaltino agricultural way of life.27  
 In response to this initial submission, COREMA returned the 
environmental study to Barrick Gold, noting its failure to describe the 
destruction of the three glaciers as a result of the project, and instructed 
the mining company to evaluate the impact of its activities on the glaciers 
with a higher level of precision before resubmitting a detailed report 
describing the measures that will be taken to mitigate the damage.28  
Barrick Gold complied, submitting plans to use explosives and bulldozers 
to remove thirteen hectares of ice from the Esperanza, Toro I, and Toro II 
glaciers,29 transporting them by truck, before dumping the ice onto another 
glacier.30  Dissatisfied with this proposal, COREMA again returned the 
study to Barrick Gold, requesting additional information regarding the 
impact of the mine on the Esperanza, Toro I, and Toro II glaciers, but 
                                                         
25
 Id. 
26
 SUSTAINABLE DEV. STRATEGIES GRP, supra note 8.  
27
 Raimundo Pérez Larrain, El caso Pascua Lama: los Huascoaltinos y el derecho 
humano al agua in GLOBALIZACIÓN, DERECHOS HUMANOS, Y PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS 409, 420-1 
(2008), available at 
http://www.observatorio.cl/sites/default/files/biblioteca/GLOBALIZACION,%20DERECHO
S%20HUMANOS%20Y%20PUEBLOS%20INDIGENAS.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014). 
28
 COMISION REGIONAL DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE REGION DE ATACAMA, INFORME CONSOLIDADO 
DE SOLICITUD DE ACLARACIONES, RECTIFICACIONES Y AMPLIACIONES AL ESTUDIO DE IMPACTO 
AMBIENTAL DEL PROYECTO 065/2000 “PASCUA LAMA” DE LA COMPAÑIA MINERA NEVADA, S.A., 
5 (2000), available at 
http://seia.sea.gob.cl/expediente/expedientesEvaluacion.php?modo=ficha&id_expediente
=3053 (last visited May 19, 2014).  
29
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 11. 
30
 IMPLICATIONS OF PASCUA LAMA, supra note 21, at 11. 
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ultimately approved the EIA on the condition that Barrick Gold resubmit a 
detailed glacier management plan.31  
In 2004, Barrick Gold submitted a modified EIA, expanding its plan 
for Pascua Lama further into Diaguita territory, and again proposing to 
remove large portions of ice from the three glaciers.32  In response, 
COREMA rejected Barrick Gold’s plan to remove the glaciers, and 
presented it with a detailed study of ways the company could prevent and 
mitigate environmental damage.33  After allegations surfaced that they had 
manipulated scientific studies to reflect findings that the Toro I, Toro II, 
and Esperanza glaciers were, in fact, not glaciers and only large ice 
reserves,34 Barrick Gold presented a new proposal explaining that the 
three glaciers would not be “removed, relocated, destroyed or physically 
affected”35 during the course of the mineral extraction and the project 
would not impact the quality of the Huasco Valley’s water.36  Despite 
public opposition, COREMA granted final approval of the Pascua Lama 
project on the condition that Barrick Gold could not remove any of the 
three glaciers, and that it had to construct a water management system.37  
After receiving the long-awaited approval from COREMA, a dispute 
in tax obligations between Chile and Argentina,38 and challenges to the 
                                                         
31
 Daniela Estrada, Conflict Over Andean Glaciers Heats Up, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS 
AGENCY (Nov. 12, 2005), http://www.ipsnews.net/2005/11/environment-chile-conflict-over-
andean-glaciers-heats-up/ (last visited May 19, 2014) [hereinafter Estrada, Conflict Heats 
Up]. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Emily Byrne, Chile’s Environmental Commission Opposes Glacier Removal Plan, THE 
SANTIAGO TIMES (June 1, 2005), http://santiagotimes.cl/chiles-environmental-commission-
opposes-glacier-removal-plan/ (last visited May 19, 2015).  
34
 Estrada, Conflict Heats Up, supra note 31. 
35
 Daniela Estrada, Activists Try to Block Start of Pascua Lama Mine, INTER PRESS SERV. 
NEWS AGENCY (May 18, 2009), http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/05/environment-chile-
activists-try-to-block-start-of-pascua-lama-mine/ (last visited May 19, 2014) [hereinafter 
Estrada, Activists].  
36
 Id.  
37
 Wanda Prassmsma, Chile Gives Pascua Lama Condition Green Light, THE SANTIAGO 
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2006), http://santiagotimes.cl/chile-gives-pascua-lama-conditional-green-
light/ (last visited May 19, 2014).  
38
 Construction of Pascua Lama was placed on hold when a tax dispute arose between 
Chile and Argentina. Unable to agree on how to divide the tax revenues from the mining 
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project’s approval39 forced Barrick to put the construction of the mine on 
hold.  During this period, the Diaguita Huascoaltinos filed a petition with 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights challenging the 
ownership of the land used for the Pascua Lama mine and alleging 
violations of their rights under international law.  
B. Nature of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ Claims Against 
Chile  
The Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ petition went before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights on December 30, 2009.
40
  The indigenous 
community’s claims against Chile were based on rights protected under 
the American Convention on Human Rights41 and Article 34 of Chile’s 
1993 Indigenous Law N° 19.253.42  The community alleged violations of its 
rights to property, consultations, and participation; interference with the 
practice of their customs and traditional way of life; and deprivations of 
their ability to provide food for themselves and make a living.43  Following 
this petition, the Commission deemed the following claims admissible and 
approved the Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ petition.44  
                                                                                                                                                         
project, the countries engaged in discussions for over two years. Argentina and Chile 
eventually determined that mining profits would be taxed by the country in which they 
were produced, as well as how and by which country “transborder services” would be 
taxed. Pav Jordan, Chile, Argentina nearing Pascua Lama Tax Deal, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 
2009), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/01/29/idUKN2931258920090129?sp=true (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2014); Victoria Bolf, Tax Dispute Delays Chile’s Pascua Lama Mine, THE 
SANTIAGO TIMES (Jan. 3, 2008), http://santiagotimes.cl/tax-dispute-delays-chiles-pascua-
lama-mine/(last visited May 19, 2014).  
39
 Jen Sotolongo, Last Chance for Opponents to Appeal Pascua Lama Project, THE 
SANTIAGO TIMES (June 6, 2006), http://santiagotimes.cl/last-chance-for-opponents-to-
appeal-pascua-lama-project/ (last visited May 19, 2014).  
40
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3. 
41
 Id. at ¶ 2. 
42
 Id. at ¶13. 
43
 Id. at ¶ 2.  
44
 After approving the claims asserted in the admissibility report, the IACHR subsequently 
held a hearing for this case in October 2011. Information related to the events following 
this hearing was unavailable. Molly Hoffsommer, Case 12.741 Agricultural Community of 
Diaguita de los Huascoaltinos, Chile, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Nov. 11, 2011), 
http://hrbrief.org/2011/11/case-12-741-agricultural-community-of-diaguita-de-los-
huascoaltinos-chile/ (last visited May 19, 2014).  
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1. Chile Violated the Diaguita’s Right to Consultation and 
Participation 
 In its petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(Commission), the Diaguita community alleged that the government failed 
to inform it of the Pascua Lama project and the results of the 
environmental studies conducted on its land.45  As a result, the community 
was unable to participate in any community consultations when the project 
was first proposed and when the exploration concession was granted to 
Barrick Gold.  Access to information, under the American Convention’s 
Freedom of Thought and Expression, is a central element of the right to 
prior consultation, and is essential for the protection of indigenous lands.46  
The Diaguita Huascoaltinos argued that by failing to provide the needed 
information regarding the project, Chile violated its right to FPIC and 
consultation under international human rights law. Regarding this issue, 
the Commission concluded: 
[O]ne of the central elements to the protection of indigenous 
property rights is the requirement that States undertake 
effective and fully informed consultations with indigenous 
communities regarding acts or decisions that may affect their 
traditional territories . . . [and that member States are 
obliged] to ensure that any determination . . . is based upon 
a process of fully informed consent on the part of the 
indigenous community as a whole. This requires, at a 
minimum, that all of the members of the community are fully 
and accurately informed of the nature and consequences of 
the process and provided with an effective opportunity to 
participate individually or as collectives.47 
 Here, the environmental agency that issued Barrick Gold the 
approval for Pascua Lama did not take into consideration the effect that 
                                                         
45
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶. 9.  
46
 Id. at ¶ 60.  
47
 Id. (citing Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District (Belize) Case 12.053, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, No. 142 (2004).  
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the extraction project would have on the indigenous community.48  The 
Diaguita were particularly susceptible to irreparable harm at the hands of 
Barrick Gold and the Pascua Lama mine, considering the impact the 
project would have on the social, cultural, and economic aspects of the 
indigenous way of life.49  By failing to consider these potential risks and 
denying the Diaguita the right to access information and participation, 
Chile threatened the entire community’s survival. 
2. COREMA’s Approval of Barrick Gold’s EIA Violated the 
Diaguita’s Right to Property and Natural Resources 
 The Diaguita Huascoaltinos argued that the approval of the Pascua 
Lama mine deprived them of their land and the natural resources found on 
it.50  They alleged that although the government had knowledge of the 
alleged fraudulent transfer of Diaguita Huascoaltino land and the pending 
civil suit regarding the matter, it granted Barrick Gold’s 2000 EIA and the 
subsequent 2006 modification.51  In addition, the approval of the project 
without the consideration of the potential cultural and environmental 
impacts on the indigenous community was also a violation of their right to 
property.52  Studies conducted during the approval process discovered 
that, since Barrick Gold was granted its exploration concession, the size of 
the Toro I, Toro II, and Esperanza glaciers had experienced fifty to 
seventy percent reduction in size. 53  The project also threatens the 
                                                         
48
 Id. at ¶ 61-2. 
49
 See Id. at  ¶ 62. 
50
 Id. at ¶14.  
51
 Id. at ¶ 57; see also Reclamo Huascoaltinos es Admitido por la Comisión 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, OBSERVSATORIO LATINOAMERICANO DE 
CONFLICTOS AMBIENTALES (Feb. 21, 2010), 
http://www.olca.cl/oca/chile/region03/pascualama448.htm (last visited May 19, 2014).  
52
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.  
53
 Camila Quieroz, Greenpeace Revela que Actividades de la Minera Barrick Gold 
Afectaron los Glaciares, ADITAL (July 20, 2011), 
http://site.adital.com.br/site/noticia.php?boletim=1&lang=ES&cod=58565 (last visited Apr. 
6, 2014); see also Thomás Rothe, Government Study Confirms Chile Glaciers Receding 
Quickly, THE SANTIAGO TIMES (Jan. 21, 2009), http://santiagotimes.cl/govt-study-confirms-
chile-glaciers-receding-quickly/ (last visited May 19, 2014).  
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community’s access to natural resources, specifically, its water supply, 
and compromises its survival.54   
 The Diaguita have a distinct and deeply-rooted connection with 
their ancestral lands.  This connection is born from a spiritual and cultural 
place, as these lands have been the site where sacred rituals and worship 
ceremonies took place.55  This indigenous community, in particular, has 
lived on this same land without interruption since colonial times, passing 
the land, and the cultural bond to it, from generation to generation.56  The 
international community has acknowledged and respected this bond in its 
treaties and declarations as well as its judicial decisions.57  The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has declared that “for indigenous 
communities, relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession 
and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully 
enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
generations.”58  
In addition, the natural resources on, and around, the lands play an 
integral role in the special relationship between the Diaguita and their 
territory.  The community’s ways of life is often centered on natural 
resources within their land, and are approached in a highly respectful and 
spiritual manner.59  Thus, when development and extraction projects 
interfere with traditional indigenous lands—as is the case here—the 
                                                         
54
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.  
55
 See Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations 
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 51, 56 (2009). 
56
 VALLEY OF THE NATIVES, supra note 14, at 99. 
57
 See infra Part II.A. 
58
 INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS OVER THEIR LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES: 
NORMS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, ¶ 56, OEA/ 
Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09 (Dec. 30, 2009) (citing Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Cmty v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter.-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79,  ¶ 
149, (Jan. 31, 2001)) [hereinafter NORMS AND JURISPRUDENCE].  
59
 Raimundo Pérez Larrain, El Caso Pascua Lama: los Huascoaltinos y el Derecho 
Humano al Agua, in GLOBALIZACIÓN, supra note 27, at 420-1.  
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community’s entire system of life is compromised, and the cultural and 
territorial integrity of the indigenous people is threatened.60  
3. Construction of Pascua Lama Deprived the Diaguita of 
the Ability to Make a Living and Interfered with Their 
Customs and Traditions 
 Upon receiving approval for the Pascua Lama mining project, 
Barrick Gold blocked access to public roads traditionally used by the 
Diaguita Huascoaltinos.61  These roads lead to Barrick Gold’s construction 
site, but they also lead to the mountainside pastures where the goats and 
mules graze, as well as to the river on which the community relies as a 
source of water.62  In addition to interfering with the free movement of 
vehicles, people, and animals along this public road, the location of the 
mine itself interferes with the community’s ability to earn a livelihood in its 
customary and traditional way.63  
The construction of the mine has compromised the quality of the 
water, and depleted the natural resources deemed essential to the 
community’s ability to make a living.64  The Diaguita depend on the water 
not only to sustain themselves and their animals, but also to grow the 
grapes, avocados, peaches and other crops they eat and sell.65 Protection 
of these natural resources is necessary to ensure the physical and cultural 
survival of the community.66  Under international law, Chile was obligated 
to seek the Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ consent and consultation, and provide 
for effective participation before exercising any control over the natural 
resources that play a fundamental role in their survival.67  
                                                         
60
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.  
61
 Id.  
62
 Id.  
63
 Id.  
64
 See Id. at ¶14. 
65
 Marianela Jarroud, Chilean Court Suspends Pascua Lama Mine, INTER PRESS SERV. 
NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/chilean-court-suspends-
pascua-lama-mine/ (last visited May 19, 2014).  
66
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C. Nature of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ Claims Against 
Barrick Gold 
Following the finding of admissibility by the Commission, the 
Diaguita Huascoaltinos filed a claim against Barrick Gold in Chile’s 
domestic courts, alleging that the mining company failed to comply with 
the conditions of the environmental impact study resulting in a threat to 
their water source.68  In April 2013, Chile’s Copiapo Court of Appeals 
ordered an injunction, suspending all work on the project while it made its 
determinations in the case.69  
The Pascua Lama project had received its environmental approval 
conditioned on the construction of a proper drainage system to prevent 
any damage to the water supply and the Toro I, Toro II, and Esperanza 
glaciers.70 The Diaguita asserted that in addition to not constructing the 
drainage system, Barrick Gold contaminated the indigenous community’s 
water source with “heavy concentrations of arsenic, aluminum, copper, 
and sulfate.”71  The General Water Department also presented studies 
confirming the significant deterioration of the nearby glaciers.72  That July, 
the court upheld the suspension, citing twenty-three environmental 
violations,73 and effectively shutting down the project until Barrick Gold put 
the proper water canals and drainage systems in place.74  
Simultaneously, Chile’s newly created Environmental 
Superintendent (SMA) completed a thorough investigation of Barrick Gold 
and its alleged environmental violations in the construction of the Pascua 
                                                         
68
 Jarroud, supra note 65. 
69
  Id. 
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 Id.  
71
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 Sarah Tory, Indigenous Groups to Appeal Chilean Court’s Ruling on Pascua-Lama, 
THE SANTIAGO TIMES (July 20, 2013), http://santiagotimes.cl/indigenous-groups-to-appeal-
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  Sarah Tory, Chilean Court Rules in Favor of Suspension of Pascua-Lama Mine, THE 
SANTIAGO TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://santiagotimes.cl/chilean-court-rules-in-favor-of-
suspension-of-pascua-lama/ (last visited May 19, 2014). 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014 
 
654 
 
Lama mine.75  Finding serious violations, SMA also suspended 
construction on the Pascua Lama project, and imposed the highest fine 
permitted by law, $16 million.76  Although the fine was a promising step in 
the right direction, the indigenous community and environmental activists 
agreed that the fine was only a small percentage of the project’s total 
budget and insignificant to a mining giant like Barrick Gold.77  
In response to SMA’s sanction and the Court of Appeals’ 
suspension, the Diaguita Huascoaltinos appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Chile.78  Similar to the Diaguita’s prayer for relief in their case against 
Goldcorp,79  the Diaguita asked the court to revoke Barrick Gold’s 
environmental permit and order the company to submit a new EIA.80  The 
court, finding the suspension and the penalties imposed by SMA sufficient, 
declined to suspend the permit, allowing Barrick Gold to resume 
construction once they put the appropriate water management systems in 
place.81  
II.  INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE 
SHORTCOMINGS OF CHILE’S DOMESTIC LAW 
Various legal frameworks, both international and domestic in 
nature, govern indigenous environmental and human rights. These rights 
are inherently linked to the indigenous community’s ownership and use of 
traditional lands.  With the increase of mineral extraction projects carried 
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 Chile Fines Barrick Gold $16m for Pascua-Lama Mine, BBC NEWS (May 24, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22663432 (last visited May 19, 2014).  
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out by transnational companies and Latin American states, these rights 
are frequently being challenged.82  Where international law recognizes 
and seeks to protect certain rights, domestic law often falls short of 
implementing and enforcing those protections.83   
A. International Protections for the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 
The existing international legal frameworks recognize the 
indigenous right to property,84 consultations,85 and FPIC;86 and protection 
of the environment and natural resources;
87
 as well as subsistence and 
economic activities.88  Flowing from the inter-connectedness of the 
indigenous community and its traditional lands,89 these rights are 
classified into three distinct, yet often overlapping categories of protection: 
(1) an environmental dimension, which acknowledges the crucial function 
of the natural resources in the advancement of an indigenous community’s 
cultural, social and economic rights; (2) a cultural dimension, which 
embraces the principle that the land is closely tied with the community’s 
traditional livelihood, customs, and way of life; and (3) an economic 
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 Lillian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the Contemporary Relationship 
Between Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure Systems and International Human Rights 
Law Regarding the Allocation of Traditional Lands and Resources in Latin America, 10 
OR. REV. INT'L L. 419, 420 (2008).   
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(2012). 
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Independent Countries, art. 16, June 27, 1989, 72 ILO Official Bulletin, 1650 U.N.T.S. 
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 Siegfried Weissner, Re-Enchanting the World: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights as Essential 
Parts of a Holistic Human Rights Regime, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 254 
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dimension, which recognizes the essential role that traditional lands play 
in the community’s livelihood.90   
1. ILO Convention 107 and ILO Convention 169  
The ILO was the first body of law to seriously address the issue of 
indigenous peoples and their rights.91  ILO Convention 107, adopted in 
1957, promoted the international community’s commitment to protect the 
rights of indigenous peoples with an emphasis on the progressive 
assimilation of the indigenous community into their respective countries.92  
As the international community shifted from an assimilative basis 
for protection to recognition of the right to self-determination93 and the 
cultural diversity within the indigenous community, ILO Convention 107 
was no longer consistent with this viewpoint.94  In 1989, ILO Convention 
169 was adopted95 and, as of 2013, ratified by twenty-two countries.96  
Chile became a party to Convention 169 on September 15, 2008, and the 
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treaty entered into force in September 2009.97  This new legal framework 
codifies the principle of FPIC and consultations, and establishes a 
procedure for the exploitation of mineral resources on indigenous lands.98  
Article 6 introduces the right to FPIC and participation, requiring 
states to “consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures 
and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever 
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures 
which may affect them directly.”99  It also creates avenues through which 
indigenous peoples may freely participate at all levels of decision-making 
in policies or projects that concern them.100  
The process of consultation must include certain elements to 
comply with ILO Convention 169.  First, the consultations should occur 
before the decision affecting the indigenous community is made.  The 
purpose of FPIC is to reach an agreement or obtain the indigenous 
community’s consent.101  To fulfill this objective, the consultation must 
occur before any decision is made.  In addition, the parties must carry out 
the consultation in good faith.  This good faith provision implies that the 
consultation should occur voluntarily and the indigenous peoples should 
have access to all the information needed to fully participate in the 
consultation.102  Another critical component to the effectiveness of the 
FPIC process is the need for the consultation to occur through appropriate 
procedures.  Although ILO Convention 169 does not explicitly create a 
standard that it considers appropriate, it does make reference to the need 
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to ensure the indigenous communities understand the proceedings.103  
This allows each indigenous community taking part in the FPIC to employ 
its own unique form of communication based on its traditions and 
customs.104  
Through this process, FPIC is able to serve as the foundation for 
other indigenous rights, such as the right to a clean environment and right 
to property.  The rights to a clean and healthy environment, and the right 
to environmental protection, are emerging rights in the international 
human rights arena.105  ILO Convention 169 addresses and codifies these 
environmental rights in the context of indigenous and tribal peoples.106  
Article 4 creates a duty for the ratifying state to adopt special measures to 
safeguard the environment of the people concerned, and requires that 
these measures be consistent with the wishes of the indigenous 
peoples.107  The state must also consider the environmental impact any 
proposed development project will have on the indigenous community 
through public participation of that community.108  The results of these 
assessments are considered fundamental to the implementation of the 
development project.109  Article 7 concludes by requiring the state to 
protect and preserve the environment inhabited by the indigenous 
communities.110  
Articles 13 and 15 of ILO Convention 169 describe different aspects 
of the indigenous community’s right to property.111  ILO Convention 169 
opens this section of the treaty by acknowledging the importance of land 
to indigenous peoples, and interprets the term “land” to mean the total 
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environment of indigenous territory.112  This provision extends the 
protections not only to the property the indigenous peoples occupy, but 
also to the nearby land whose use is a necessary component to their 
traditional way of life.113 
Recognizing the critical link between the land, its natural resources, 
and the indigenous communities, ILO Convention 169 offers special 
safeguards to the indigenous peoples’ right to participate in the use, 
management, and conservation of the natural resources on the land they 
inhabit.114  Furthermore, Article 15 speaks to states, like Chile, where the 
government owns the minerals.  In these instances, the state must consult 
with the affected peoples and determine how the implementation of a 
development project may infringe on their rights.115  These consultations 
must occur before exploration or exploitation rights to the concerned land 
are transferred.116  
2. American Convention on Human Rights 
 The Organization of American States (OAS) is made up of thirty-
five independent states that came together in 1967 for the purpose of 
promoting solidarity and cooperation amongst the states.117  The member 
states of OAS approved the incorporation of the American Convention on 
Human Rights into The Charter in 1967.118  This international instrument 
recognized that man’s fundamental rights arose from his status as a 
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human being, not his citizenship within a country.119  The American 
Convention recognized principles set out in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; for instance, that freedom can only be fully enjoyed if the 
conditions are established where man can pursue his economic, cultural, 
and social rights free from fear of persecution.120  
 The American Convention outlines both the right to participate in 
government,121 as well as the freedom of thought and expression, under 
Article 13.122  These articles provide two essential elements to the 
informed consultation process. Article 13 facilitates the consultation 
process by recognizing the freedom to “seek, receive, and impart” 
information; and ensuring indigenous peoples have the information 
necessary to be fully informed.123  In addition, the right to participate in 
government recognizes “the right of every citizen to take part in conduct of 
public affairs,”124 ensuring that the indigenous community has the 
opportunity to “participate in decision-making on matters and policies that 
affect or could affect their rights.”125  For the indigenous community, both 
the right to participate and the freedom to access information are 
fundamental elements of the right to consultation, and are linked to other 
human rights, including the indigenous peoples’ right to property.126  
This right to property is laid out in Article 21 of the American 
Convention, which recognizes the right to the use and enjoyment of 
private and communal property.127  In the context of indigenous peoples, 
the right to property is often considered in conjunction with Article 25’s 
right to judicial protection when it is alleged that the community’s right to 
use and enjoy their property has in some way been infringed and the state 
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has failed to provide prompt recourse.128  Two examples of this are Awas 
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua and Saramaka v. Suriname; in both 
cases, the state granted concessions to natural resources found within 
indigenous territory, and then failed to respond to the community’s claims 
in regards to those concessions.129 
In Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the indigenous community 
petitioned the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to stop Nicaragua 
from granting a logging concession on traditionally communal lands.130  
Nicaragua argued that the lands claimed by the community belonged to 
the state, and that the community did not have a real property title deed to 
the land.131  The court stated that in this context, the term “property” had a 
distinct meaning from the meaning it had in domestic law.132  At the 
international level the term encompassed those items that were movable 
and immovable, tangible and intangible.133  The court also described 
human rights treaties as “live instruments whose interpretation must adapt 
to the evolution of the times, and specifically, to current living 
conditions.”134  The court concluded that the Awas Tingni community had 
possessed the land in question, and based their ownership of it as a 
community, not as individuals.135  The court held that, under Article 21 of 
the American Convention, the indigenous peoples had a communal 
property right to the land, and by granting logging concessions without the 
community’s consent, the state had interfered with the community’s 
fundamental basis of  culture, integrity, and economic survival.136 
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 Similarly, in the landmark case of Saramaka v. Suriname, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights found that indigenous communities have 
the right to own the natural resources they have traditionally used within 
their lands just as they have the right to own the land they have 
traditionally occupied.137  The court declared that protection of these 
natural resources was essential to ensure the physical and cultural 
survival of the community.138  The court also identified safeguards that the 
state was obligated to enforce for the protection of indigenous rights to 
land and natural resources, starting with the effective participation of the 
Saramaka people “in conformity with their customs and traditions.”139 
These safeguards would be implicated in all government acts “regarding 
any development, investment, exploration, or extraction plan within 
Saramaka territory.”140  In addition, the state was required to comply with 
its obligation to ensure that it did not issue any concessions within 
indigenous territory until an independent environmental and social impact 
study was completed and approved.141  
3. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People 
 Concerned with the increasingly prevalent discriminatory practices 
towards minority populations, a United Nations Economic and Social 
Council established a Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 
1982.142  The group was charged with reviewing developments related to 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples and 
developing an international standard concerning these rights.143  With the 
participation of indigenous representatives and national governments, the 
group began drafting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 1985, submitting the complete draft for 
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consideration in 1993.144  Twenty years, and several consultations and 
revisions later, the final version of UNDRIP was adopted in 2007. As of 
December 2010, it has reached a global consensus.145 Chile was among 
the 144 countries to adopt UNDRIP on September 13, 2007.146  
 Although not legally binding on its signatories, UNDRIP carries with 
it the expectation that member states will comply with its subject matter,147 
and may in time rise to the level of customary law.  This international 
instrument outlines the rights of the indigenous peoples recognized and 
protected by the international community, building on earlier frameworks, 
such as ILO Convention 169.148  UNDRIP affirms that indigenous peoples 
are equal to all people, and at the same time recognizes their right to be 
different.149  It was developed, in part, out of concern for the manner in 
which indigenous lands had historically been taken, preventing the 
communities from development in accordance with their customs and 
traditions.150  
  The legal protections extended to indigenous lands are derived 
from the deeply intertwined relationship between the communal lands and 
the peoples’ spirituality and traditional way of life.151  Article 26 describes 
the indigenous community’s right to use and control the lands they have 
traditionally owned or occupied and the state’s obligation to grant legal 
protection and recognition to the lands.152  The community also has the 
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right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the use of 
their land and natural resources under Article 29.153   
 UNDRIP also takes the principle of consultation set forth in ILO 
Convention 169, and reintroduces it as an obligation to obtain consent.154  
Where ILO Convention 169 only requires the indigenous community to 
give consent in decisions that will result in its displacement,155 UNDRIP 
requires that FPIC be obtained in all decisions that affect them.156  In 
addition, Article 10 requires FPIC be obtained where the indigenous 
community will be relocated and prohibits the state from forcibly removing 
them from their land.157  The state is also responsible for facilitating the 
participation of the community in decisions concerning their rights in a 
manner consistent with their customs.158  
 Article 3 of the declaration recognizes an indigenous community’s 
right to self-determination and its ability to freely pursue economic, social, 
and cultural development,159 while not being subject to forced assimilation 
and the destruction of its culture.160  Article 20 further safeguards the 
development and survival of the indigenous communities by protecting 
enjoyment of their unique means of providing food for themselves and 
making a living.161  
 These international instruments as a whole identify and establish 
the rights and protections guaranteed to indigenous and tribal peoples; 
however, there exists a gap between the creation of the obligation on an 
international level and the implementation and enforcement of the treaty 
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domestically.162  International treaties rely on the political will of domestic 
governments to adequately implement and enforce its obligations.163  The 
resulting implementation gap has allowed member states to comply with 
international commitments on paper, while in reality not completely 
adhering to the requirements of the treaty.164  
B. Chile’s Domestic Laws Fail to Satisfy its International 
Obligations under ILO Convention 169 
A party to an international treaty must adjust its law to ensure 
consistency with the treaty.
165
 Upon signing ILO Convention 169, Chile 
became obligated to implement its provisions within its domestic law.  
Chile responded by implementing Executive Decree 124; however, this 
law severely limited the FPIC process and was inconsistent with ILO 
Convention 169.166  In addition, Chile was required to modify its laws 
regulating the environment, the mining industry, and other areas that have 
an impact on indigenous peoples, but again Chile’s modifications came up 
short.167      
1. Indigenous Law No. 19.253 and Executive Decree 124 
Enacted in 1993, the Indigenous Law recognizes and protects 
various aspects of Chile’s indigenous communities, including its customs, 
education, and development.168   In particular, Articles 12 and 13 describe 
protections to indigenous lands; however, the emphasis is on identification 
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and transfer of indigenous territory.169  The Indigenous Law fails to grant 
any protection to the indigenous community’s right to use and occupy the 
land.170  It is also more restrictive in its interpretation of indigenous 
territory, in comparison to ILO Convention 169.171  Here, the limited 
protections offered do not extend to the natural resources used by 
indigenous peoples, only to the actual land they occupy within the 
boundaries of their territory.172  
Chile ratified ILO Convention 169 on September 15, 2008.173  Soon 
after the treaty entered into force one year later, then-President Michelle 
Bachelet enacted Decree 124, severely limiting FPIC in Chile.174  The 
purpose of the decree was to regulate the manner in which consultations 
and indigenous participation occurred.175  Nevertheless, the language of 
the decree is inconsistent with ILO Convention 169, only extending 
indigenous peoples the right to express their opinion regarding new 
government actions that directly affect them, excluding actions of 
investment and extraction companies, in accordance with the procedure 
established by the decree.176  Instead, these companies are subject to the 
consultation and participation procedures established by the relevant 
government agencies through, for example, the environmental or mining 
laws.177  However, Chile’s Mining Code, discussed below, makes no 
provision for consultation with indigenous peoples.178 
Decree 124 limits the obligation to obtain FPIC by only requiring 
that certain sectors of the government complete the consultation 
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process.179  In addition, municipalities, which tend to have the most 
contact and impact on indigenous peoples, are not required to participate 
in the FPIC process.180  Decree 124 makes FPIC optional for 
municipalities so they may engage in the consultation process, if it deems 
it necessary.181  Adding to the list of limitations, Decree 124 imposes a 
time limit on the consultation process.182  The municipality will only accept 
community observations up to thirty days from the date the indigenous 
community received the last notice regarding the project that triggered the 
FPIC process.183  In contrast, ILO Convention 169 provides for the right to 
consultation, participation, and FPIC at every stage of development, of 
any matter that affects their rights, and in a manner consistent with the 
indigenous peoples’ procedure.184  Despite efforts to repeal Decree 124 
and adopt new consultation laws,185 it continues to be in force. 
2. Chile’s Environmental Framework  
Ley de Bases del Medio Ambiente, or Ley 19,300, enacted in 1994 
and amended in 2010,186 is the principal framework for regulating the 
country’s environmental protection.187  Before the 2010 amendment, the 
statute was responsible for reestablishing the role of Chile’s national 
environmental authority (CORAMA) and the regional counterpart 
(COREMA), identifying a formal system of review for EIA studies, and 
establishing liability for environmental damage.188 
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Article 1 of the Chile’s Environmental Framework Law, Law No. 
19.300, establishes the “right to live in an environment free of pollution,”189 
a principle shared by the Chilean Constitution of 1980.190   Article 10 
identifies mining development projects as an activity that is likely to cause 
environmental damage, while Article 11 requires that an EIA be completed 
before the projects that “have significant adverse affects on the quality or 
quantity of renewable natural resources, including land, water, and air” are 
executed or modified.191  Once submitted, COREMA,192 along with the 
National Mining and Geology Service (SERNAGEOMIN), and any other 
relevant public agency, will evaluate the EIA study and return it to the 
project owner with its observations and concerns.193  The project owner is 
then responsible for responding to those concerns and complying with any 
requirements made by the agencies.  Upon full completion of the 
observations and requirements, COREMA issues an Environmental 
Approval Resolution (EAR), granting the project permission to move 
forward under Article 16.194  
These laws also provide for specific public participation procedures 
to take place during the evaluation of the EIA.195  Article 27 requires the 
project owner to publish an excerpt of the EIA in the Official Gazette, 
where laws and decrees are published, as well as in local and  national 
newspapers.196  COREMA must also send the excerpt to the communities 
that will be impacted by the proposed work,197 and the community then 
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has sixty days to submit any concerns to the commission.198  COREMA 
takes into consideration the citizens’ concerns at the conclusion of the 
approval procedure,199 but this protocol serves more as a way to inform 
the public because citizen concerns are not binding on the agency.200  
This environmental framework is not intended to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples, as it only extends the opportunity for participation 
without making any commitment to act on the observations.201  
Furthermore, the public participation procedures are not accommodating 
to the usual and customary methods of communication used by 
indigenous communities.202  The lack of specific procedures allows the 
agency and project owners to carry out the public participation component 
with an unacceptable degree of discretion and reduces the effectiveness 
of the provision.203 
One reason Chile’s environmental framework has not been fully 
implemented is due to a conflict between the country’s economic interests 
in the mining industry and the legal obligations under these laws.204  The 
Catchments Management and Mining Impacts in Arid and Semi-Arid 
South America Project released the results of an environmental study in 
Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, identifying four reasons why Ley 19,300 has not 
been fully implemented:  
(1) economic criteria are often weighed more heavily than 
technical or environmental concerns; (2) stakeholder and 
public participation in the process is hindered by insufficient 
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administrative support and assistance and the environmental 
impact assessment time frame “is not long enough for 
people to understand the depth of the implications for each 
project;” (3) control of the projects is technically under 
jurisdiction of local administrative services, but these 
services generally do not have sufficient resources to 
adequately process proposed projects; and (4) Law No. 
19,300 allows projects to start before approval.205 
Other criticisms of this environmental law include the inadequacy of 
the EIA; the lack of proper policies and regulations; the lack of 
enforcement and sanctions; and the agency’s tendency to make political 
decisions as opposed to technical ones.206  Critics also disapprove of the 
framework’s reliance on political will for enforcement and the inadequate 
protection of natural resources.207 
3. Chile’s Mining Laws: Mining Code, Mining Concession 
Law, and Bilateral Mining Treaty 
Today, mining is the largest and most lucrative industry for Chile, 
and brings in the most foreign investment to this Latin American 
country.208  Prior to the enactment of Chile’s Mining Code and Mining 
Concession Law in 1983, the government owned and operated all of the 
country’s mines and mineral deposits.209  The mining laws brought 
privatization of all new mines and mineral deposits, and an influx of 
transnational mineral extraction companies.210  Article I of the Mining Code 
provides that Chile has exclusive and inalienable rights to all mines and 
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subsurface mineral deposits.211 The state is, however, able to grant 
concessions under Article 2, which confers property title to the holder of 
the concession.212  This title applies only to subsurface minerals and 
mines, and is distinct from the title to the surface land on which the mining 
project is taking place.213 
 The Constitutional Mining Concession Law supplements the Mining 
Code, describing the basic doctrine laid out in the Mining Code and also 
outlining the rights of concession holders.214  The Concession Law grants 
the concessionaire the exclusive right to prospect and excavate, while the 
Mining Code limits the right to “prevent damages to the owner of the land 
or to protect public interest purposes.”215  This limited reference to the 
rights of the surface property owner is indicative of Chile’s typical 
approach of undermining the rights of its indigenous peoples in favor of 
the mining industry. 
 While the Mining Code and the Mining Concession Law detail the 
rights of the government and of concession holder, they do little to identify 
the rights of indigenous landowners.  Specifically, there is no express 
reference to the consultation process that should be undertaken when 
subsurface minerals are located on indigenous territory, in violation of 
Article 15 of ILO 169.216   
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III.  MODIFYING CHILE’S LAW TO REFLECT THE PROTECTIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
  Although moving towards increased protection of indigenous 
peoples’ rights, existing domestic law has failed to adequately implement 
and enforce international protections.  While having the potential to 
guarantee that rights to land and natural resources are not infringed, ILO 
169 and FPIC have fallen short of that goal in Chile.217  This article 
proposes that Chile implement a domestic legal framework similar to 
Venezuela and Peru.  These countries have each been able to 
successfully implement FPIC into their respective constitutions and 
enforce it adequately.  
 Chile and its indigenous populations would also benefit from 
establishing private sector compliance incentives.  ILO Convention 169 
and UNDRIP do not impose legal obligations on the extraction companies 
themselves; however, the Chilean government must still satisfy its 
commitments to the indigenous peoples regardless of the transnational 
company’s involvement in the project.218  Failure to consult indigenous 
peoples and obtain FPIC in the Pascua Lama mining project has led to 
highly publicized litigation and extensive financial consequences for 
Barrick Gold.219  This negative result to what was to be the world’s largest 
open pit mine may drive mining companies to seek locations outside of 
Chile for future mining projects.  Chile would benefit from encouraging 
transnational companies to respect FPIC obligations at the inception of the 
project, and thereby reduce the likelihood that this series of events will 
repeat itself. 
A. Implementation of Domestic Laws Recognizing the 
Obligation to Obtain FPIC 
To fulfill its obligations under ILO Convention 169, Chile must 
repeal Decree 124.  Rather than enact a new executive decree, the right 
                                                         
217
 El Derecho, supra note 101, at 192-3. 
218
 Tendai Zvobgo, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Implications for Transnational 
Enterprises, 13 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 37, 37 (2012).  
219
 Tory, supra note 2.;  BBC NEWS,  
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014 
 
673 
 
to FPIC should be a part of the national constitution, and Congress should 
create a law establishing the procedures that model Venezuela’s and 
Peru’s approaches.220  Executive decrees tend to be inconsistent and 
depend on the will of the executive office.221  In contrast, constitutional 
recognition of the FPIC process would provide “a greater stability over 
time, as well as security” as opposed to an executive decree.222 
1. Venezuela’s Constitutionalization of ILO Convention No. 
169 and Comprehensive Bill of Indigenous Rights 
Venezuela’s 1999 National Constitution codifies the social, cultural, 
and economic rights of the country’s indigenous peoples.223  It recognizes 
their customs, their language, and the “original rights to the lands they 
ancestrally and traditionally occupy.”224  Under this new constitution, 
indigenous property rights are non-transferable, inalienable, and 
collective, protecting traditional lands from the common threat of 
seizure.225  Article 120 addresses the exploitation of natural resources 
located on Native lands and requires that the state engage the indigenous 
peoples in informed consultations prior to the implementation of any 
exploitation project, implementing domestically the country’s international 
obligations.226  Article 125 recognizes the right to participate in the 
government and provides for indigenous representation in the 
legislature.227  
This constitutional recognition of indigenous rights—specifically 
FPIC—has been implemented in several Latin American countries, 
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including Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia.228  By incorporating the 
indigenous right to FPIC into the national constitution, Chile would extend 
to the indigenous community special protections already in place in its 
neighboring Latin American countries.229  Constitutionalizing the 
international indigenous right to FPIC will ensure the enforcement of these 
rights and improve the political status of the indigenous community, as has 
been the case in Venezuela.230  
Venezuela has also adopted a comprehensive bill of indigenous 
rights within the constitution, in addition to the constitutional recognition of 
indigenous rights.  The Organic Law for Indigenous Peoples and 
Communities (LOPCI), adopted in 2005, outlines in language similar to 
ILO Convention 169, the procedure for FPIC.231  Article 54 requires 
informed and freely expressed consultation when natural resources found 
on Native lands will be exploited.232  Article 55 extends this obligation to all 
projects, whether public or private, and whether located entirely on Native 
lands, or on only a portion of Native lands.233  In addition to the right to 
consultation, indigenous peoples also have the right to object to proposed 
projects when they affect their cultural or environmental integrity.234  
Venezuela also goes further than Chile’s Decree 124 by offering technical 
and legal assistance to indigenous peoples to ensure that they are fully 
informed and have access to the FPIC process.235  
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2. Peru’s Cooperative Effort and Database of Indigenous 
Peoples 
Although Peru ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1994,
236
 Peru’s 
legislature did not enact domestic laws regulating the FPIC process until 
September 2011.237  During the seventeen years before the enactment, 
Peru was the most problematic state in the Inter-American System with 
regard to indigenous rights, having been issued the most adverse 
judgments by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and having the 
most individual petitions filed against it.238  Peru’s Law on the Right to 
Prior Consultation of the Indigenous or Native Peoples (Law Decree No. 
29785) serves not only to identify the policies and procedures of FPIC in 
Peru, but as a way to prevent the violent protests the country had been 
experiencing in relation to the violation of internationally recognized 
indigenous rights.239  
Article 1 requires that Law Decree No. 29785 be interpreted in 
conformity with ILO 169’s obligations.  The law goes on to describe the 
process and purpose of the consultations.  Unlike Chile’s Decree 124, the 
Peruvian framework uses language very similar to that used in ILO 
Convention 169, closing the implementation gap between international 
and domestic law.240  
In addition, the law calls for the collaboration of Congress and other 
government agencies, such as the Ministry of Energy and Mining and the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communication, to implement FPIC.241  
Through this cooperative effort, for example, Congress is charged with 
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creating the laws, policies, and procedures that govern FPIC, the Ministry 
of Energy and Mining is responsible for investigations into proposed 
development and extraction projects, and the Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication ensures the full participation of indigenous peoples in 
the consultation process.242   
To further implement the FPIC process and facilitate information 
sharing, Law Decree No. 29785 creates a database of indigenous 
communities and their representatives, ensuring that project owners and 
government agencies share information regarding projects that affect 
indigenous rights in a timely manner.243  The database must identify the 
indigenous community’s leader or representative, the community’s 
geographical location, languages spoken within the community, as well as 
any relevant cultural information.244 
Chile should adopt a law similar to Venezuela’s indigenous law and 
Peru’s cooperative effort, as well as the indigenous database to more 
effectively abide by its FPIC obligations.  This law would create a system 
of checks and balances where each relevant government agency is 
responsible for a particular aspect of the FPIC process.  Each agency 
would then be held accountable to the other agencies, making it more 
likely that the obligations will be respected.  Accordingly, the indigenous 
database will facilitate the consultation process and safeguard the rights of 
the indigenous community by gathering and sharing all relevant 
information before any decision affecting it is made.  
B. Private Sector Incentives to Encourage Compliance with 
the FPIC Process 
A unique element of Peru’s Law Decree No. 29785 is its 
requirement for private sector compliance through the adoption of 
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education measures.245  All investment companies whose proposed 
projects concern indigenous rights must engage in FPIC discussions at 
the inception of the process under this law.246  By educating the extraction 
companies about the obligations and process of FPIC, Peru has ensured 
the protection of indigenous interests.  
Chile could implement a similar requirement, in which a prerequisite 
for receiving a mining concession would be the participation in an FPIC 
education session.  During these FPIC forums, the private companies 
would be informed of the obligation and procedure of FPIC, in addition to 
the ramifications resulting from a failure to comply.  A major concern for 
private companies with FPIC is the risk that indigenous consultation will 
result in extensive delays and cost the company millions of dollars;247 
however, failure to respect the FPIC procedures can and likely will be an 
even costlier risk.  
One example of the consequences of not respecting FPIC is that of 
the El Morro mine.  Goldcorp, a Canadian mining company, learned an 
expensive lesson after also failing to obtain the consent of the Diaguita 
Huascoaltino community during the construction of El Morro; a gold and 
copper mine located in the Huasco Valley.248  Goldcorp lost its 
environmental permit in May 2012 when the Chilean Supreme Court 
upheld suspension of the $3.9 million project and ordered it to seek the 
consent of the Diaguita community.249  The court found that SMA did not 
adequately consult with the Diaguita community when its construction was 
likely to compromise the community’s water supply, harm their herding 
animals, and interfere with the rights to their traditional lands.250  The 
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suspension resulted in a year-long delay and a significant increase in the 
mining company’s operating costs.251  
Barrick Gold and the Pascua Lama mine is also a perfect 
illustration of just how costly failure to comply with FPIC can be.  After 
Chile’s environmental regulator found that Barrick Gold had seriously 
violated their environmental permit and then tried to conceal their 
violations, it imposed a $16 million fine, the highest permitted by law.252  
When calculating the initial cost of the project, the cost of delays, the fines, 
and the cost of the modifications ordered by the court, Pascua Lama has 
cost Barrick Gold over $5 billion.253  In fact, Barrick Gold recently made 
the decision to call off all work on the Pascua Lama mine in order to sell 
off shares and pay off some of its debt.254  
Aside from seeking legal recourse, indigenous peoples have the 
ability to greatly hinder the plans of an extraction company.  The 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) released their Sustainability 
Framework in August 2011, in which it presented the result of a year and 
half’s worth of public consultations.255  In it, the IFC described the various 
routes an indigenous community can take to block a mining project it has 
not consented to.  Some of these measures are peaceful, including 
protests and rallies, roadblocks, and permit appeals.256  However, at times 
these challenges can turn violent and lead to instances of excessive use 
of force by police or the company’s private security, thus, opening up the 
company to liability for human rights violations.257  
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Conversely, where private sector extraction and development 
companies have complied with the FPIC process, public opinion of the 
companies has improved, while difficulty in obtaining approval permits has 
decreased.258  Chile and Argentina’s Bilateral Mining Treaty259 has paved 
the way for more transnational and multinational corporations to propose 
extraction and development projects in this region.260  By implementing an 
education condition into domestic law, these figures may deter private 
companies from moving forward with their projects without complying with 
FPIC. 
CONCLUSION  
The right to FPIC and consultation is fundamental to the protection 
of key human rights in the indigenous community.261  In particular, when 
FPIC is not respected, an indigenous community’s right to property and 
natural resources is severely threatened.262  The existing body of 
international jurisprudence identifies and outlines the indigenous 
community’s right to FPIC, consultation, participation, and property, in 
addition to several others.  These instruments recognize the uniquely 
intertwined relationship between indigenous peoples and the land they 
have traditionally occupied.263  Nevertheless, the domestic implementation 
of these rights has fallen short of the intended goal.264  
In particular, Chile’s failure to implement and enforce adequate 
FPIC laws threatens the cultural and physical survival of the country’s 
indigenous peoples.265  In a country like Chile, where the extraction 
industry is such a vital economic activity, indigenous communities are at a 
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greater risk of having their right to FPIC violated when the country weighs 
its economic interests more heavily than indigenous and environmental 
rights.266 In the case of the Pascua Lama mine, the Diaguita 
Huascoaltinos were deprived of their right to FPIC at every stage of the 
project. Barrick Gold made no attempt to consult with the Diaguita 
Huascoaltinos, and after manipulating the EIA process, was granted a 
mining concession that gave them free reign of Diaguita land.267  
This article submits a proposal that addresses this two-part problem 
by enforcing the obligations on the state and encouraging the compliance 
of the private sector.  First, Chile should amend its constitution to include 
their FPIC obligations and pass a comprehensive bill outlining the process 
and procedure of FPIC obligations.  This law should create a cooperative 
system of checks and balances among the relevant government agencies 
to ensure full compliance and an indigenous database that will facilitate 
the dissemination of information.  This type of domestic law would not only 
close the implementation gap, but it would also ensure that enforcement 
does not depend solely on Chile’s political will.  Second, Chile should 
create an educational prerequisite and require private extraction and 
development companies to engage in FPIC forums before they are eligible 
to obtain exploration concessions.  During this process, the financial and 
social risks of non-compliance with FPIC would be made known, while 
also providing the company with the information and tools needed to 
respect the FPIC obligation.  By implementing these changes, Chile will be 
able to protect the rights of its indigenous communities and reduce the 
likelihood that what happened in the case of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos 
and the Pascua Lama mine will continue to repeat itself.   
 
                                                         
266
 Free Market Environmentalism, supra note 204, at 271-2. 
267
 Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 2, 9, 11-4. 
